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In this Article, we offer a current examination of just how 
much the First Amendment does—or does not—confer special 
“academic freedom” privileges on members of public university 
communities. Most of our focus is doctrinal, although we do 
identify and critique various theoretical and functional justifi-
cations for and against First Amendment protections along the 
way. In a similar vein, many of our observations are descrip-
tive—we try to categorize and analyze what courts, when con-
fronted with modern disputes, do and are likely to do—but at 
various points we interject some normative arguments in favor 
of a robust role for free speech in the modern public university. 
While issues relating to university students and faculty are in 
important respects different, we address both in an attempt to 
flesh out the meaning of First Amendment academic freedom in 
higher education somewhat comprehensively. Our Article dis-
cusses First Amendment considerations with respect to stu-
dents first, and then with respect to faculty. Finally, we close 
with some brief observations about legal academic freedom pro-
tections that extend beyond the First Amendment realm. 
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I.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
OF PUBLIC COLLEGE STUDENTS   
Describing the scope and meaning of the academic freedom 
of public university students is a daunting task. To some ex-
tent, it is a matter of university policy and custom. A university 
may elect to permit its students more freedom of speech than it 
is required to tolerate by the First Amendment or other legal 
mandates—subject of course to limitations imposed by law to 
protect the rights of other students or third parties. Our focus 
in this Article, however, is on the extent to which the Constitu-
tion—in particular, the First Amendment—protects the aca-
demic freedom of students and faculty at public colleges and 
universities. That question is not susceptible to a clear or easy 
answer. Indeed, we freely acknowledge that this Article raises 
far more questions than it can even attempt to resolve. 
Two branches of free speech doctrine may apply to student 
speech on public college campuses. One branch is grounded in 
public high school cases that appear to treat the regulation of 
student speech on school grounds as a special situation to be 
evaluated under a distinctive framework of review. While we 
recognize (and address) the fact that the high school and college 
settings may differ with regard to compulsory attendance, ma-
turity of students, etc., the analyses drawn from high school 
cases are often used as starting points for courts confronting 
disputes in the university setting, and sometimes for good rea-
son. So we think it helpful to identify paradigmatic high school 
cases up front. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Communi-
ty School District, the Supreme Court held that school authori-
ties can restrict private student expression only if the speech at 
issue materially disrupts the educational program or impinges 
on the rights of other students.1 In a subsequent case, Hazel-
wood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court also applied an 
education-specific framework, although it distinguished Tinker 
in holding that student speech in school-sponsored activities 
could be restricted as long as the reason for doing so was rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.2 
The other doctrinal branch involves more conventional free 
speech doctrine in which the standard of review applied by 
courts is determined by examining the nature of the regulation 
restricting speech, the location in which the speech occurs, and 
 
 1. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 2. 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988). 
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the kind of speech being regulated—with the analysis of the lo-
cation where the speech occurs being particularly vexing. 
Courts are tasked with categorizing a speech location as either 
a traditional public forum, a designated or limited public fo-
rum, or a non-public forum.3 This determination is often critical 
because the standard of review of different regulations varies 
depending on the kind of forum which is at issue. In a tradi-
tional public forum, viewpoint- and content-discriminatory reg-
ulations receive strict scrutiny and content-neutral regulations 
receive intermediate level scrutiny.4 By contrast, in a non-
public forum—the default category for most public property—
although viewpoint-discriminatory regulations still receive 
strict scrutiny, both content-discriminatory and content-neutral 
restrictions will be upheld as long as they are found to be rea-
sonable regulations of speech—a relatively lenient standard of 
review.5 
The designated and limited public forums are the most dif-
ficult to understand, in part because the courts have not always 
used these terms consistently or coherently. The designated 
public forum is best described as an “area[] that the govern-
ment has affirmatively opened up generally for expressive pur-
poses.”6 Speech regulations governing a designated public fo-
rum are evaluated under the same rigorous standard of review 
applied to regulations governing traditional public forums.7 
Limited public forums are “forums created for, and limited to, 
specific expressive purposes and speakers.”8 The standard of 
review applied to speech regulations governing limited public 
forums is particularly complicated. Enforcement of the parame-
ters for restricting access to the limited public forum for its 
specific purpose will be upheld if the parameters are viewpoint-
neutral and reasonable.9 
 
 3. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
44–46 (1983). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78, 682 
(1998). 
 6. Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom 
Claims in a Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between 
Debate-Dampening and Debate-Distorting State Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 505, 507 (2011). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 506; see also Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 
F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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As intimated earlier, the Tinker line of authority seems en-
tirely distinct from forum doctrine. Indeed, Tinker was decided 
before forum doctrine became very fully developed. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the great majority of lower courts treat Tinker as 
having created a sui generis standard entirely divorced from 
questions about the nature of the forum or the kind of regula-
tion which is at issue.10 More importantly for our purposes, 
Tinker is rarely employed as the proper standard of review for 
student speech cases at colleges or universities.11 
The relationship between the Hazelwood analysis and fo-
rum doctrine is even harder to understand. The incoherence of 
judicial discussions about any meaningful relationship between 
the two and the ambiguous analysis of indeterminate factors 
discussed within the Hazelwood opinion itself has sown consid-
erable confusion.12 Moreover, unlike Tinker, Hazelwood has a 
reach that in fact has extended to college campuses. While the 
Court in Hazelwood explicitly left the issue of the decision’s ap-
plicability to colleges open,13 the majority of lower courts con-
sidering the issue have agreed that Hazelwood applies to the 
regulation of school-sponsored student speech at a public uni-
versity at least in some circumstances.14 Thus, any discussion of 
 
 10. See Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: 
Bringing Order out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-
Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 717, 730–34, 742–44 (2009). 
 11. But see DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317 (3d Cir. 2008) (ap-
plying a Tinker “threat of disruption” standard in evaluating university sexual 
harassment policy). 
 12. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 744–84. 
 13. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988). 
 14. See, e.g., Jane Doe I v. Valencia Coll. Bd. of Trs., 838 F.3d 1207, 1211 
(11th Cir. 2016) (accepting Hazelwood standard for university student speech, 
but concluding that activity at issue was not a school-sponsored activity); 
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2012); Keeton v. Anderson-
Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 874–76 (11th Cir. 2011); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 
734 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285–89 
(10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947–51 (9th Cir. 2002); Ala. Stu-
dent Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1346–47 
(11th Cir. 1989). 
Other courts have refused to apply Hazelwood to free speech cases involv-
ing students at universities. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F. 3d 920, 932–33 
(9th Cir. 2016) (confirming that the Ninth Circuit has not extended Hazelwood 
to the university setting); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 862–63 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has so far “declined to apply [Ha-
zelwood’s] deferential standard in the university setting” although it has not 
formally rejected the standard, either); McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 
232, 247, 250 n.12 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphatically insisting that public universi-
ties have less leeway in regulating student speech than public elementary or 
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student academic freedom on college campuses has to begin 
with a deep, if sometimes unsatisfying, analysis of the Hazel-
wood decision. 
Hazelwood involved a free speech claim brought by student 
staff members of a high school newspaper published in a grad-
ed, faculty-supervised journalism class who challenged the de-
cision by the school’s principal to censor certain articles the pa-
per planned to publish.15 The federal court of appeals sided with 
the students, who argued both that the school had created a 
public forum in its operation of the student newspaper and that 
the principal’s reasons for censoring the paper could not satisfy 
the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Tinker. There 
was nothing about the censored articles which suggested that 
they would materially disrupt the educational mission of the 
school or impinge on the rights of other students.16 
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice White, writing for 
the majority, began his analysis by insisting that the free 
speech rights of students in public schools were not “coexten-
sive with the rights of adults in other settings.”17 Government 
could censor student speech in a public school that could not 
otherwise be censored if it was expressed outside of the school 
or student settings.18 The justification for adopting a special 
rule for students in public schools was grounded in part on the 
nature and function of educational institutions—what the 
Court described as “the special characteristics of the school en-
vironment.”19 To a significant extent, this is little more than 
constitutional law embodying common sense. Schools are in the 
business of evaluating and regulating speech. The function of 
education involves discrimination among ideas, information, 
 
high schools, but also noting cryptically that “we decline to consider whether 
the teachings of Hazelwood apply in the university setting”); Kincaid v. Gib-
son, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (determining that the district 
court erred in applying Hazelwood—a case involving the First Amendment 
rights of high school students—to a university setting); Student Gov’t Ass’n v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (conclud-
ing that Hazelwood is not applicable to cases involving college newspapers). 
 15. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262–64. 
 16. Id. at 265–66. 
 17. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
682 (1986)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969)). 
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and the styles of expression. Content-neutral education is an 
oxymoron.20 
Justice White also alluded to a federalism and separation-
of-powers foundation for his position. The task of resolving edu-
cational issues arising out of the operation of the public schools 
should be decided by local school boards, school administrators, 
and teachers—not federal judges.21 The federal judiciary should 
not become a de facto national school board setting policy for 
the country’s schools. 
At this point in his opinion, Justice White seemingly re-
verses course, speaking not of school-specific considerations but 
in more familiar forum-analysis terms. Perhaps the Court be-
lieved it had to respond to the conclusion of the court of appeals 
that the school created a public forum by publishing the stu-
dent newspaper. In any case, Justice White engages in a con-
ventional forum inquiry and demonstrates, at least to the ma-
jority’s satisfaction, that the evidence does not establish by 
policy or practice that the school intended to open up the pages 
of the newspaper to indiscriminate student use or to relinquish 
any selective control over the content of the periodical.22 
This analysis, however, has some built-in limitations: (1) it 
applies conventional forum analysis to speech in a high school 
setting while school is in session; and (2) it suggests that if 
school authorities intentionally create some kind of designated 
or limited public forum in a school-sponsored activity, they can 
be held to have waived any special prerogatives they might 
otherwise assert for regulating student speech.23 More im-
portantly, Justice White’s opinion, perhaps inadvertently, rais-
es another forum question. Generally speaking, public property 
that is not a traditional public forum (a street or a park), and 
which has not been intentionally opened up by the government 
for private expressive purposes, is identified as a non-public fo-
rum.24 By citing conventional public forum/non-public forum 
cases in its discussion of whether the Hazelwood school author-
 
 20. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 21. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267, 273. 
 22. Id. at 267–71. 
 23. See id. It is clear that forum analysis applies when schools regulate 
access to school facilities that are not being used for the school’s educational 
purposes. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384, 390–93 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–70 (1981). The 
creation of a forum in an ongoing school activity is another matter entirely. 
 24. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78 
(1998). 
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ities have created a designated public forum, Justice White’s 
opinion can be read to imply that school-sponsored activities 
are by default a non-public forum and should be treated as 
such.25 Justice White repeatedly writes that because the school 
has not created a full-fledged public forum in the pages of the 
student newspaper, it is entitled to regulate the content of the 
publication in any reasonable way.26 This reasonableness lan-
guage parallels the standard of review applied in non-public fo-
rum cases and Justice White cites conventional non-public fo-
rum case law to support his conclusion.27 
We are not convinced that this is the best reading of Ha-
zelwood.28 We recognize that several district and circuit courts 
have interpreted Hazelwood to hold that at least some school-
sponsored activities should be characterized as non-public fo-
rums.29 Accordingly, these courts conclude that the regulation 
of student speech in these activities should be evaluated under 
the same standard of review applied to speech regulations in a 
non-public forum. Other courts, however, reject this position 
and read Hazelwood to create a distinct standard of review for 
the regulation of speech in school-sponsored activities.30 This 
issue is critically important because while content-
discriminatory and content-neutral restrictions on speech in a 
non-public forum will be upheld as long as they are reasonable, 
viewpoint-discriminatory regulations of speech in a non-public 
forum receive strict scrutiny review. Thus, if school-sponsored 
activities are non-public forums, school administrators and 
teachers cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in regu-
lating student speech. Because the question of whether, as a 
categorical matter, Hazelwood identifies school-sponsored ac-
tivities as non-public forums remains contested, the question of 
whether school authorities can discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint in regulating school-sponsored activities remains in-
determinate as well.31 
 
 25. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267–70. 
 26. Id. at 267, 270. 
 27. Id. at 267 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37 (1983); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 
473 U.S. 788 (1985)). 
 28. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 776–84. 
 29. Id. at 777 n.202 (citing cases identifying school-sponsored activities 
that may be non-public forums). 
 30. Id. at 781 n.221 (citing cases that use Hazelwood as a distinct stand-
ard). 
 31. See id. at 776–84 (summarizing arguments that appear on both sides 
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After completing its discussion of why the Hazelwood stu-
dent newspaper is not a public forum, Justice White’s opinion 
shifts direction once again. The issue in school-sponsored activ-
ities cases is not whether a school must tolerate student 
speech, it explains; that was the issue resolved in Tinker for 
private student speech.32 When student speech is expressed in a 
school-sponsored activity, the issue is whether the First 
Amendment requires “a school affirmatively to promote partic-
ular student speech.”33 School authorities must surely have the 
ability to control student speech that community members 
“might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.”34 When a school is essentially refusing “to lend its name 
and resources to the dissemination of student expression,” its 
regulation of student speech will be upheld as long as it is “rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”35 Only 
when the school’s actions serve “no valid educational purpose” 
does the First Amendment require judicial intervention.36 
This analysis supports an analogy between the regulation 
of school-sponsored activities and yet another First Amend-
ment doctrinal category—so-called government speech. When 
the issue is whether government resources will be used directly 
or indirectly to promote a particular message, the First 
Amendment provides little, if any, constraint on the govern-
ment’s decisions. Justice White’s language in this part of the 
opinion resonates with such an understanding. Asking whether 
government decisions are reasonably related to legitimate state 
interests or whether they serve no valid purpose smacks of 
highly deferential rational basis review. Similarly, the Court 
has held that when the government is engaged in a state func-
tion that requires the exercise of editorial discretion, the First 
Amendment does not require judicial review of the state’s in-
trinsically discretionary decisions.37 If one were attracted to 
this analogy, the open questions would be why the Court in 
Hazelwood suggested that there are any real free speech con-
straints on the messages a school chooses to endorse and, if 
 
of the circuit split). 
 32. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 271. 
 35. Id. at 272–73. 
 36. Id. at 273. 
 37. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998). 
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some such constraints exist, how exactly a court is to determine 
what constitutes a legitimate pedagogical purpose.38 
Finally, Justice White appears to shift course yet again to-
ward the institutional analysis with which he began his opin-
ion. He suggests that the distinctive nature of public schools 
requires that educators be given special prerogatives. Schools 
must be able to regulate student speech in order to ensure that 
students learn what the school is trying to teach.39 Educators 
must be able to take into account the maturity level of stu-
dents, and limit the material students are exposed to accord-
ingly.40 Administrators need to be able to restrict student 
speech in circumstances where the school would be erroneously 
perceived as endorsing the student’s message.41 Finally, dis-
putes about what is taught in a public school and how it is 
taught are much more a matter for local political and profes-
sional decision-making than they are problems to be resolved 
through federal constitutional adjudication.42 
As noted earlier, many, but certainly not all, lower courts 
have determined that Hazelwood extends to public colleges and 
universities. Often the decision to apply or not to apply Hazel-
wood is conclusory, with little justification offered for the 
court’s decision.43 In other cases, the court determines whether 
Hazelwood applies to the particular context in which the free 
speech dispute arose, but explicitly leaves open the applicabil-
ity of Hazelwood in other circumstances.44 
Given the intrinsic ambiguity as to Hazelwood’s meaning, 
the wariness of some courts to apply Hazelwood in a college 
setting is understandable. The case law applying Hazelwood to 
free speech disputes in elementary, junior high, and high school 
 
 38. What constitutes a legitimate pedagogical purpose, of course, has not 
been an easy question for courts to answer. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 
775–76. 
 39. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 271–72. 
 42. Id. at 273. 
 43. See, e.g., Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 
473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating simply that Hazelwood does not apply to 
colleges and universities). 
 44. See, e.g., Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 864 n.10 (9th Cir. 
2015) (stating that Hazelwood does not apply to the case before it involving 
student speech in a professional certification program, but “we need not and 
do not decide whether the Hazelwood standard can ever apply in the context of 
student speech at the college and university level”). 
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settings can be charitably described as an incoherent sham-
bles.45 There is little reason to believe it will be better reasoned 
and more consistent at the college level where courts must con-
front the additional question of how Hazelwood’s application 
should change in the setting of a public university. Yet it is not 
remotely clear what framework courts should apply instead of 
Hazelwood. Thus, in McCauley v. University of the Virgin Is-
lands, for example, a Third Circuit panel warned that the Ha-
zelwood analysis should not be taken as gospel in adjudicating 
free speech cases involving public universities because elemen-
tary and high school authorities have more “leeway” in regulat-
ing student speech than their university counterparts.46 But the 
court conceded that “it is difficult to explain how this principle 
should be applied in practice and it is unlikely that any broad 
categorical rules will emerge from its application.”47 This diffi-
culty of identifying alternative doctrine may help explain the 
willingness of some courts to apply Hazelwood in the university 
context. 
On the merits, there are arguments on both sides as to 
whether the Hazelwood analysis should extend to public uni-
versities. We can begin by focusing on the situation where a 
Hazelwood standard might seem most justified—core curricular 
decisions, pedagogical choices, professorial control of the class-
room, and the evaluation of research and other student work 
product. Hazelwood itself—and lower courts applying its analy-
sis to elementary schools and high schools—suggests that max-
imum deference is due school authorities in these situations.48 
Is there any basis for thinking that deference in these realms 
should not be extended to a university’s administration and 
faculty? 
One reason identified by some courts relates to the age of 
students whose speech is restricted. College students are in-
crementally older and more emotionally and intellectually ma-
ture than public school students. They are deemed to be more 
independent and less impressionable than students attending 
 
 45. See generally Brownstein, supra note 10, at 719–75 (describing how 
lower courts have inconsistently applied Hazelwood). 
 46. 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 759, 775–76 (describing how various 
courts have deferred to schools in cases involving “pedagogical concern[s]” re-
lating to curriculum and classroom decisions). 
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public schools.49 College administrators no longer have an in lo-
co parentis relationship with students.50 They do not need to 
impose order and discipline on college students as they would if 
they were dealing with children attending public school.51 Col-
lege students are adults and should have the same free speech 
rights as adults. Judges opposed to the application of Hazel-
wood emphasize some or all of these arguments in explaining 
why Hazelwood provides an inappropriate framework for adju-
dicating free speech cases. 
All of these contentions are accurate at least to some ex-
tent, but it is not altogether clear why this differential in age 
should be a determinant factor in resolving the deference due 
administrators and instructors in free speech disputes. This is 
particularly true in light of the current Court’s apparent dispo-
sition to treat the free speech rights of teenagers to be largely 
equivalent to the free speech rights of adults.52 There is a far 
greater difference in age and maturity between a student in el-
ementary school and a student in high school than there is be-
tween a high school senior and a community college freshman, 
and yet Hazelwood applies across this age spectrum.53 It may 
be true that the age and maturity of students are relevant to an 
evaluation of the pedagogical purpose of a challenged re-
striction on speech54—perhaps a middle school English teacher 
 
 49. See, e.g., Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863; McCauley, 618 F.3d at 246. 
 50. See, e.g., McCauley, 618 F.3d at 243–45. 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 245–46; DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315–16 
(3d Cir. 2008) (explaining the special need of public elementary and secondary 
school administrators to maintain discipline, a concern that is largely lacking 
at the university level). 
 52. See Brown v. Merch. Entm’t Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–99 (2011) (rely-
ing on traditional First Amendment doctrine to examine a statute prohibiting 
the sale of violent video games to minors). In B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area 
School District, a student free speech case challenging restrictions at a public 
high school, the court quoted Brown in affirming that “‘minors are entitled to a 
significant measure of First Amendment protection’ and the government does 
not ‘have a free floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be 
exposed.’” 725 F.3d 293, 314 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing Brown, 564 U.S. at 794). 
 53. See generally Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (“[M]any high school seniors are older than some college freshmen and 
junior colleges are similar to many high schools.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (suggesting 
that, in some instances, whether a student is in high school or college could be 
determinative); Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734 (emphasizing differences in emotional 
maturity); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289–90 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(noting maturity differences between high school and college students); 
Pompeo v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 58 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1190 (D.N.M. 
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may legitimately limit speech about human sexuality that 
might be an entirely reasonable subject of discussion in a col-
lege literature class55—but the standard of review applied 
would be the same in both cases. 
Most importantly, the lack of maturity of students in pub-
lic schools was only one of the grounds the Court asserted to 
justify the Hazelwood standard of review. And in our judgment 
it was probably the least important. The core arguments under-
lying the Hazelwood decision were the need to control student 
speech in school-sponsored activities in order to accomplish the 
school’s pedagogical goals and the repeated concern about con-
trolling expression that bore the imprimatur of the school. To 
what extent do these interests change if the school in question 
is a university instead of a high school? 
One plausible response to this question asserts that the 
mission of the university is fundamentally different than that 
of a public school. The function of the university isn’t to instill 
orthodoxy; it is to encourage inquiry and debate in the unfet-
tered marketplace of ideas.56 Students need some degree of aca-
demic freedom to develop the creativity and analytic skills that 
are necessary to develop new knowledge and engage an increas-
ingly changing world.57 Freedom of speech is the foundation of 
the role that public universities play in our society and that 
freedom extends to student speech in the college classroom as 
well as the university at large.58 
 
2014) (discussing relevance of maturity expectations to examination of a 
course syllabus). 
 55. See, e.g., Ward, 667 F.3d at 734. 
 56. See, e.g., DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315 (“It is well recognized that ‘the col-
lege classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the marketplace of 
ideas . . . .’” (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972))). 
 57. As the court in Oyama v. University of Hawaii explained in justifying 
the importance of academic freedom and student free speech rights in a public 
university, “the progress of our professions . . . may depend upon the ‘discord 
and dissent’ of students training to enter them: it is by challenging the inher-
ited wisdom of their respective fields that the next generation of professionals 
may develop solutions to the problems that vexed their predecessors.” 813 F.3d 
850, 864 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty. Cmt. Coll. Dist., 
605 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, any adjudication of public col-
lege student free speech claims must “reflect the ‘special niche’ universities 
occupy ‘in our constitutional tradition.’” Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 329 (2003)). Significantly, “the Court’s [high school] student speech 
cases provide no basis for doing so.” Id. 
 58. See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 
2010) (discussing the “‘critical importance’ free speech has in our public uni-
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We appreciate the force of this argument, but there is a 
contrary argument that deserves attention as well. Inquiry and 
debate in a college classroom may require orchestration. The 
goal of having numerous ideas expressed and evaluated may be 
starkly inconsistent with the right of each student to express 
what he or she thinks is important during a class discussion. 
Further, not all ideas are of equal relevance or merit. Nor are 
all sources of information of equal quality or veracity.59 A uni-
versity classroom is not a public forum where all speech must 
be accepted on a content-neutral basis.60 
Also, the university’s role as a certifying or credentialing 
institution must be more stringent than a public school’s. A 
high school may strive to have all students develop and learn to 
the best of their ability. Graduation does not necessarily 
demonstrate competence in any specific area of expertise or for 
any particular vocation. A university degree purports to recog-
nize that the graduate has a body of knowledge and skills that 
are necessary for employment in a particular field or more ad-
vanced, specialized study. Indeed, the more advanced the 
course of study, the more important it is that students master 
particular material and skills.61 Many programs involve stu-
 
versities” (quoting DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 314)); DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315 (“Dis-
cussion by adult students in a college classroom should not be restricted.”). 
 59. In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, for example, the court found the reasoning 
of Settle v. Dickson County School Board, a high school case, to be fully appli-
cable to a college free speech case. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1287 (citing 
Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155–56 (6th Cir. 1995)). Settle ex-
plained that  
teachers, like judges, must daily decide which arguments are rele-
vant, which computations are correct, which analogies are good or 
bad, and when it is time to stop writing or talking. . . . [I]t is the es-
sence of the teacher’s responsibility in the classroom to draw lines 
and make distinctions—in a word to encourage speech germane to the 
topic at hand and discourage speech unlikely to shed light on the sub-
ject. Teachers therefore must be given broad discretion to give grades 
and conduct class discussion based on the content of speech. 
Settle, 53 F.3d at 155–56; see also Ward, 667 F.3d at 733–34 (explaining that 
the key common denominator in high school and college student free speech 
cases is “student” and that, during instructional activities at both levels, 
teachers need the authority to restrict student speech in order to further ped-
agogical goals). 
 60. See, e.g., Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(finding that Augusta State University’s counseling program constituted a 
non-public forum). 
 61. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290–91 (implying that the need for ac-
ademic discipline does not necessarily diminish as students grow older and 
that, indeed, the need for rigorous control over the educational environment 
may increase as the course of study progresses). 
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dents participating in field work or directly providing services 
to clients as part of their training.62 In many cases, the parame-
ters of permissible debate necessarily narrow to satisfy the 
university’s role in establishing and confirming competency and 
awarding credentials.63 
Perhaps most importantly, rigorous judicial review of a 
teacher, department, or university’s educational decisions in 
the name of protecting student speech risks subordinating the 
academic freedom of the faculty and institution to the expres-
sive prerogatives of students—and it assigns to the federal 
courts the authority to determine what constitutes acceptable 
pedagogical and educational standards.64 Here there is an addi-
tional distinction between the high school and university con-
text, but it is a distinction that does not necessarily undermine 
the propriety of adjudicating certain student speech disputes at 
a university under Hazelwood. 
The separation-of-powers and federalism concerns which 
supported judicial deference to local school boards and school 
administrators in Hazelwood may be less important in a college 
context.65 Public universities are not always under the control 
 
 62. See, e.g., Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876 (recognizing the student clinical 
practicum in which students are trained to counsel clients is school-sponsored 
activity which bears the imprimatur of the university). When students’ speech 
is restricted while they are actually providing counseling to clients as part of 
their professional training, some courts evaluate such speech regulations un-
der the doctrinal framework applied to restrictions on public employee speech. 
See, e.g., Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (ruling 
that the test for regulating private speech of employees applied because Watts 
was not simply a student, but an employee of the counseling practicum). 
 63. See, e.g., Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 866–72 (9th Cir. 
2015) (finding that the university had “legitimate concerns” and could “take 
action” to deny him certification); Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprima-
turs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, 
413 (2013) (noting the existence of “significant deference [to universities] in 
the certification cases”). 
 64. Federal judges, not surprisingly, are often wary of assuming any such 
role. See, e.g., Keeton, 664 F.3d at 883 (Pryor, J., concurring) (“In matters of 
instruction and academic programs, federal judges must . . . exercise re-
straint.”). 
 65. It is worth noting that some conservative members of the current 
Court seem far less interested in separation of powers and federalism concerns 
in the student speech context than the Justices who formed the Hazelwood 
majority. To these Justices, school authorities are state actors and there is 
every reason to be as suspicious of their decisions to restrict student speech as 
the speech restrictive decisions of any other government official. See, e.g., 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422–25 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that public school authorities “act as agents of the State” when they regu-
late student speech). 
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of an elected board. Moreover, the idea that publicly elected of-
ficials should control the operation of a public university has 
nowhere near the persuasive traction of the argument that el-
ementary schools and high schools should be under local, demo-
cratically established control. Indeed, the opposite is the case. 
It is often recognized that the university as an institution needs 
considerable autonomy and academic freedom to do its job ef-
fectively. 
While this last argument may persuasively distinguish 
public colleges from public high schools in one sense, it may be 
a pyrrhic victory for the purpose of arguing for less judicial def-
erence to college administrators and faculty in student speech 
cases. The commitment to university institutional autonomy 
and the academic freedom of departments and faculty66 may 
provide an even stronger impetus to, and foundation for, judi-
cial deference than the arguments for local control of public 
schools. And there is no comparable tradition or functional jus-
tification for recognizing the institutional autonomy of public 
schools or the academic freedom of their instructional staff. 
The final foundation for applying Hazelwood to universi-
ties relates to student expression that bears the imprimatur of 
the school. There is no plausible basis for arguing that student 
speech in a classroom could be reasonably perceived to bear the 
imprimatur of the school when students are asked to express 
their own views on a subject.67 But that is true both for discus-
sions in high school and college classes. The approval of written 
work and research projects is more problematic. No one will 
think that the student handing in his or her assignment is 
speaking for the school. However, by accepting and positively 
evaluating student work product, the school is arguably giving 
the content of the project an imprimatur of approval. 
This concern has been accepted by some courts adjudicat-
ing disputes involving the certification of students for profes-
sional roles such as a teacher. Thus, as one court explained: 
 
 66. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217, 237 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Regents of the Univ. of 
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985)) (“Academic freedom thrives not only 
on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and 
students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous 
decisionmaking by the academy itself.”); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he curriculum of a public educational institution is one means 
by which the institution itself expresses its policy, a policy with which others 
do not have a constitutional right to interfere.”). 
 67. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 882 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
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“When the University recommends a student for certification 
[as a teacher], it communicates to the world that, in its view, 
that student is fit to practice the profession; as a result, the 
University places its ‘imprimatur’ on each student it approves 
to teach.”68 Arguably, the scope of this argument may apply to 
degrees which do not involve formal certification as well. 
There is one additional reason to doubt that college stu-
dents have greater free speech rights than their junior high 
school or high school counterparts. Public school students are 
subject to compulsory education laws. They are required to at-
tend school and in doing so subject themselves to the school’s 
speech regulations. College students have the opportunity to 
examine the curriculum of a college beforehand and will make 
the decision to attend a particular university as a matter of 
choice. There is at least an argument that this lack of compul-
sion counts against a university student’s challenge to curricu-
lar or pedagogical decisions that limit his or her speech.69 
We do not purport to choose sides on the propriety of apply-
ing Hazelwood to university student speech disputes arising 
out of core school-sponsored activities. There are strong argu-
ments both for applying and for rejecting Hazelwood and per-
haps even stronger arguments for applying it in one context but 
not another. Our primary point is to demonstrate the uncer-
tainty that pervades the adjudication of these cases as a consti-
tutional matter. If uncertainty as to whether a right or freedom 
will be protected chills the exercise of that right, students al-
legedly exercising their free speech rights in school-sponsored 
activities at a university may experience some cold drafts while 
doing so. 
As a descriptive matter, we think in many cases that col-
lege students will have a difficult time successfully asserting 
free speech challenges against university decisions regarding 
the content of courses and pedagogy in the classroom or with 
regard to the supervision and evaluation of research and writ-
ing projects.70 This does not mean, however, that students will 
 
 68. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 862; see also Waldman, supra note 63, at 393 (dis-
cussing how students certified by a university bear its imprimatur). 
 69. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A prospec-
tive university student has the capacity to learn what a curriculum requires 
before applying to the school and before matriculating there.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1288 (10th Cir. 
2004) (quoting Brown, 308 F.3d at 949 with approval) (confirming that student 
free speech cases “make clear that the First Amendment does not require an 
educator to change the assignment to suit the student’s opinion or to approve 
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always be without redress. As we explained earlier, some courts 
interpret Hazelwood to be grounded in non-public forum doc-
trine. In these circuits, an argument that college classroom or 
research and writing restrictions constitute viewpoint discrim-
ination cannot be dismissed out of hand.71 
Even if a court does not hold that viewpoint discrimination 
necessarily requires strict scrutiny review,72 courts recognize 
that as a general matter, viewpoint discrimination runs coun-
ter to core free speech principles. Accordingly, while applying 
deferential review, a court may still be uneasy with the argu-
ment that viewpoint discrimination serves a valid pedagogical 
purpose. Certainly, college students may not be punished be-
cause they hold or express religious or political beliefs that are 
inconsistent with the passionately held opinions of college ad-
ministrators or professors.73 However, establishing that a pro-
fessor or department’s decision restricting speech is based on 
animus toward a student’s religious or political beliefs rather 
than permissible academic or professional evaluations of the 
quality of the student’s work and her commitment to academic 
or professional standards may be a very difficult burden of 
proof for a student to satisfy.74 
There is an unstated due process dimension to freedom of 
speech claims on campus that may also provide some incidental 
protection to students. Courts may be suspicious of academic or 
professional standards asserted to justify speech restrictions 
that are recognized for the first time after a student’s speech 
has been sanctioned and she has challenged the university’s 
decision.75 When after-the-fact rationalizations are offered to 
 
the work of a student that, in his or her judgment, fails to meet a legitimate 
academic standard”). 
 71. See, e.g., Keeton, 664 F.3d at 871–77 (characterizing master’s program 
in counseling to be a non-public forum requiring viewpoint neutrality and rec-
ognizing the applicability of Hazelwood to review of the program’s require-
ments). 
 72. See, e.g., Pompeo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 58 F. Supp. 3d 
1187, 1189 (D.N.M. 2014) (holding that Hazelwood does not require viewpoint 
neutrality in the regulation of a student’s curricular speech). 
 73. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 872; Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1293. 
 74. See, e.g., Keeton, 664 F.3d at 872–75 (discussing student’s difficulty in 
proving discrimination on the basis of her stated religious beliefs); id. at 880–
83 (Pryor, J., concurring) (noting that a public university cannot discriminate 
against student speech simply because it is concerned “that the student might, 
in a variety of other circumstances, express views at odds with the preferred 
viewpoints of the university”). 
 75. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 736 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing 
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defend a university’s actions, courts may be more open to the 
argument that the university is attempting to conceal imper-
missible motives. Similarly, courts may not countenance the 
sand-bagging of students by changing standards to exclude un-
popular speech. Thus, a professor who describes the content of 
a course as controversial and invites disagreement with the 
professor’s views in the syllabus will have difficulty explaining 
why a particular student’s speech on a class assignment is un-
acceptable and requires the student’s exclusion from the class.76 
There is also a distinction drawn between the regulation of 
speech in a school-sponsored activity and retaliation against 
students who express disagreement about the content or opera-
tion of a school-sponsored activity. A student who privately 
complains to an instructor or the administration about class 
requirements and is threatened with sanctions for doing so is 
engaged in protected expression which does not bear the im-
primatur of the school.77 While students may be required to 
comply with curricular demands with which they disagree, they 
have a free speech right to express that disagreement in appro-
priate circumstances.78 
What if a university restricts student speech in an activity 
that is not a part of the curriculum, but is arguably sufficiently 
school-sponsored to still fall within the analytic rubric of Ha-
zelwood? Lower courts have struggled to determine the param-
eters of Hazelwood in public school cases. The resulting at-
tempts to distinguish school-sponsored from non-school-
sponsored activities have produced a hodge-podge of incon-
sistent holdings.79 
Some, but certainly not all, of this confusion may be avoid-
ed in university cases because there are strong reasons for nar-
rowing the range of non-curricular activities to which Hazel-
wood applies on a university campus. College student 
organizations are often considered to be more independent of 
the university than public school clubs and activities. The uni-
 
the possibility that a reasonable jury could find the university’s policy on re-
ferrals “an after-the-fact invention”). 
 76. Pompeo, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1190. 
 77. Jane Doe I v. Valencia Coll. Bd. of Trs., 838 F.3d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir. 
2016). 
 78. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 874 (explaining that a student remains free to ex-
press disagreement with the curriculum of a university’s counseling program, 
but she must abide by the professional requirements imposed by the program). 
 79. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 758–70. 
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versity student group is less likely to have a faculty sponsor. 
The range of student organizations on a college campus is typi-
cally so broad and involves so many diverse perspectives that it 
would be impossible to believe that the university endorses all 
of their discordant expressive activities.80 Thus, in many cases 
there is little risk that student speech outside of curricular ac-
tivities will be understood to bear the imprimatur of the school. 
Indeed, universities often explicitly disclaim any suggestion 
that they endorse the expressive activities of student organiza-
tions.81 No one sensibly thinks that the University of Illinois 
Student Republican Club reflects the political position of the 
university administration or its faculty. 
There are other non-curricular student activities which are 
sponsored by universities and which the university maintains 
are intended to further specific educational goals. Student gov-
ernments are one example. Here, for instance, courts have held 
that restrictions on participation in a student government elec-
tion and the regulation of electioneering activities are reviewa-
ble under a Hazelwood analysis.82 University student newspa-
pers and other periodicals are also alleged to serve educational 
purposes and courts have considered Hazelwood in reviewing 
university restrictions on the content of these publications.83 
In this regard, it is clear that money matters and the fact 
that a university funds a student activity or periodical may 
support deferential review of restrictions on student speech 
under Hazelwood or under government speech doctrine which 
permits the government to control the messages it expresses or 
 
 80. Indeed, when a university sponsors a broad range of student organiza-
tions, it will be held to have created a limited public forum. See, e.g., Christian 
Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 
U.S. 661, 674 (2010) (noting that the law school created a limited public forum 
through its Registered Student Organization requirements); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995) (ruling that the 
Student Activities Fund, which funded many student groups, created a limited 
public forum). 
 81. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823–24. 
 82. See, e.g., Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 
867 F.2d. 1344 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Hazelwood analysis to university 
regulations of student government campaign literature and debates); Flint v. 
Dennison, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218–20 (D. Mont. 2005) (applying Hazel-
wood analysis to spending limits for student government elections). 
 83. See, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735–38 (7th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (holding that Hazelwood’s framework applies to subsidized student 
newspapers). 
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subsidizes.84 However, the presence or absence of university 
funding is not dispositive in determining how rigorously courts 
should review the regulation of university-subsidized student 
expressive activities. The fact that a university student news-
paper is financially self-sufficient from advertising revenue 
standing alone may not conclusively establish its independence 
from university control. One can imagine a situation in which a 
financially self-sufficient student newspaper was created with 
university capital, bears the university’s name, and has always 
been subject to close administrative or faculty supervision of its 
content. These would be relevant factors for a court to consider 
in determining the appropriate standard of review to apply to 
censorship of the periodical. 
Similarly, the existence of university funding does not nec-
essarily support deferential judicial review. University subsi-
dies can be provided in such a manner that courts will find that 
the university has created some kind of public forum for diverse 
student expression.85 That finding would require the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny for content- and viewpoint-discriminatory 
regulations of speech. Although it is uncommon, in some cir-
cumstances, state law explicitly declares that a student news-
paper at a public university constitutes a public forum.86 
A particular thorny question may arise when student 
groups invite controversial speakers to campus, sometimes 
with the indirect or direct financial support of the university. If 
these events are considered to be school-sponsored activities, 
speech restrictions limiting disturbances of the speaker’s lec-
ture can be upheld under highly deferential review. It is at 
least arguable that greater protection might be extended to the 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824–29 (deeming legal principles 
pertaining to limited public forums applicable to university’s Student Activi-
ties Fund, the goal of which was “to support a broad range of extracurricular 
student activities that ‘are related to the educational purpose of the Universi-
ty’”); Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737 (stating that the rules established by the Student 
Communications Media Board composed of both students and faculty mem-
bers, pertaining to a subsidized student publication, “could be thought . . . to 
create a designated public forum”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 351 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (finding that university-subsidized yearbook constituted a 
limited public forum); Lueth v. St. Clair Cty. Cmty. Coll., 732 F. Supp. 1410, 
1415 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (deeming university’s student-run, university-funded 
newspaper “a forum for public expression”). 
 86. See, e.g., Moore v. Watson, 838 F. Supp. 2d 735, 755–56 (N.D. Ill. 
2012) (recognizing that by virtue of Illinois state law, the student newspaper 
at a public university constitutes a designated public forum). 
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“heckling” of a speaker in a non-academic setting.87 The argu-
ment that the invited speaker’s lecture is a school-sponsored 
activity would most likely be enhanced if an academic depart-
ment or unit co-sponsors the event—a not uncommon occur-
rence. 
Finally, we confront the regulation of student speech that 
cannot be characterized as school-sponsored. Off campus, stu-
dents are residents of a municipality and state. They are sub-
ject to all of the laws restricting speech that govern the expres-
sion of non-students. And they are protected by the same free 
speech doctrine that applies to everyone else in the community. 
To what extent does this analysis change when students en-
gage in expressive activities on campus? 
The problem is complicated for several reasons. As noted 
previously, courts have recognized the historic function of the 
university as a location where new, creative, unorthodox, and 
critical ideas can be exchanged and debated. In modern times 
at least, that tradition of open thought and experiment and a 
corresponding abstract commitment to freedom of speech has 
extended to students.88 That understanding supports a consti-
tutional regime protecting the free speech rights of students—
even in circumstances in which their speech would not be pro-
tected off campus. 
Conversely, there is the reality that the university owns 
most, if not all, campus property. In a conventional town, most 
suppliers of goods and services, such as restaurants, stores, and 
apartment buildings are under private ownership. The gov-
ernment has no authority to restrict the private speech of pa-
trons in such locations. The private owners of these enterprises 
on the other hand have no constitutional constraints limiting 
their authority to control expressive activities of patrons on 
their property. When the university takes on these convention-
ally private roles, we might evaluate its ability to restrict stu-
dent speech under various models. All such property might be 
considered to be a non-public forum unless it is deliberately 
 
 87. In In re Kay, for example, the California Supreme Court concluded 
that while no one has a free speech right to disrupt or obstruct a meeting, 
some negative expressive conduct from the audience such as heckling, inter-
ruptions, asking hard questions, and booing would receive some First 
Amendment protection. 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970). Whether allegedly dis-
ruptive conduct could be sanctioned required a multi-factor analysis examin-
ing both the nature of the meeting and the extent to which the protestors’ con-
duct had substantially impaired the event. Id. at 150–51. 
 88. See, e.g., Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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opened up for expressive purposes. Alternatively, the universi-
ty acting as a proprietor rather than a regulator might be given 
the same authority to restrict the speech of its student patrons 
as a private landlord or restaurant owner. Yet another alterna-
tive suggests that because the university controls the entire 
environment in which students live, because a college campus 
is recognized as a location where speech and unorthodox ideas 
should be freely and robustly exchanged (both inside and out-
side the classroom), and because students are self-actualizing 
individuals with dignity interests deserving of respect, univer-
sity restrictions on speech in the general campus must be sub-
ject to some level of serious review.89 
Even if we put areas where the university operates as a 
proprietor, such as dormitories and dining halls, aside, there 
are no easy answers to the question of how student free speech 
rights vary by campus location. The uses to which property is 
put on a university campus are extraordinarily diverse.  
A modern university contains a variety of fora. Its facilities may in-
clude private offices, classrooms, laboratories, academic medical cen-
ters, concert halls, large sports stadiums and arenas, and open spaces 
. . . . [O]pen spaces . . . at most major universities, come in a number 
of different types. Some are enclosed quadrangles bordered on all 
sides by university buildings and traversed by sidewalks, while others 
are grassy areas or plazas on the edge of campus . . . .90 
The analogies available to us remain ambiguous. The 
streets and parks of a town are traditional public forums where 
speech is provided maximum constitutional protection.91 All 
other public property is a non-public forum unless the govern-
 
 89. One court noted the following in explaining why college administra-
tors should have less leeway in regulating student speech than high school 
administrators: 
[U]niversity students, unlike public elementary and high school stu-
dents, often reside in dormitories on campus, so they remain subject 
to university rules at almost all hours of the day. The concept of the 
“schoolhouse gate” . . . and the idea that students may lose some as-
pects of their First Amendment right to freedom of speech while in 
school . . . does not translate well to an environment where the stu-
dent is constantly within the confines of the schoolhouse. 
McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 90. Bowman, 444 F.3d at 976–77; see also Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 
1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that because the public university at 
issue includes “classrooms, lecture halls, private offices, laboratories, dormito-
ries, a performing arts center, sports facilities, open spaces, a botanical gar-
den, a planetarium, a center for wildlife education, and a museum[,] . . . any 
attempt to affix a single label on so large and diverse a campus likely would 
render the forum analysis meaningless”). 
 91. Bowman, 444 F.3d at 975–76. 
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ment intentionally opens the property up for general or specific 
expressive purposes—with the government waiving any right of 
selective review of the speakers granted access to the so-called 
designated or limited public forum.92 The parameters of the 
traditional public forum are jealously guarded by doctrine. An 
interior sidewalk leading to a post office, for example, is a non-
public forum.93 While the fact that people may come and go at 
will on public property is relevant to an analysis of whether a 
public forum exists, it is only one factor to consider and is not 
dispositive of the issue.94 
Should the walkways, paths, and park-like open spaces on 
a university campus be analogized to municipal streets and 
parks95 or are they more appropriately analogized to an interior 
sidewalk and characterized as a non-public forum?96 And what 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990). 
 94. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
 95. Some courts have noted the resemblance between a university campus 
and a municipality. In Hays County Guardian v. Supple, for example, the 
court described Southwest Texas State University in these terms:  
Roughly 5,000 students live and work on the campus, making the 
campus, in the words of the University’s own promotional booklet, a 
“town” of which the resident student will be a “contributing citizen” 
and “voting member.” The campus’s function as the site of a commu-
nity of full-time residents makes it “a place where people may enjoy 
the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed en-
vironment[ ]” . . . and suggests an intended role more akin to a public 
street or park than a non-public forum. 
969 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) (quoting Heffron v. Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981)). 
 96. While most courts do not conclude that a street-like or park-like area 
on a college campus is a traditional public forum, the case law remains uncer-
tain and provides little in the way of clear standards or guidelines for adjudi-
cating location-based free speech disputes. In Brister v. Faulkner, for example, 
the court held that university property linking the city sidewalk to the en-
trance to a university events center was a public forum for constitutional pur-
poses because the property at issue was indistinguishable from the public 
sidewalk adjacent to it. 214 F.3d 675, 682–83 (5th Cir. 2000). Similarly, the 
court held in McGlone v. Bell that perimeter sidewalks surrounding a public 
university, which were owned by the university but were adjacent to and in-
distinguishable from municipal sidewalks, were properly characterized as a 
traditional public forum. 681 F.3d 718, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2012). 
Most open areas within a campus, however, will not be misunderstood to 
be municipal streets or parks and will be understood to be university, rather 
than municipal, property. Determining how such internal campus property 
should be characterized for free speech purposes has proven to be a problemat-
ic task. In Bowman v. White, the court explained that because a university 
serves different functions than municipal streets, parks, or theaters, “streets, 
sidewalks, and other open areas that might otherwise be traditional public 
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about all of the other campus property which is used for myriad 
different purposes? Is all other university property by default a 
non-public forum?97 While courts are reluctant to identify a 
campus location as a traditional public forum, clearly, in some 
 
fora may be treated differently when they fall within the boundaries of [a] 
[u]niversity’s vast campus.” 444 F.3d at 978. Judge Bye’s concurring opinion, 
however, challenged the majority’s analysis. He argued that locations on a 
university campus that have the physical characteristics of streets and parks 
and are used as open public thoroughfares are traditional public forums. Id. at 
984–91 (Bye, J., concurring). In Souders v. Lucero, the court determined that 
even an open college campus is not a public forum similar to streets and parks 
as to which both students and nonstudents alike have a right of access. 196 
F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). In Gilles v. Garland, an opinion regrettably 
not selected for publication, the court held that open space at a public univer-
sity identified as the academic quad was a limited public forum. 281 F. App’x 
501, 510–11 (6th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, speech regulations governing such 
areas would be upheld as long as they were content-neutral and reasonable. 
While concurring in the judgment, Judge Moore challenged that conclusion 
and argued that a majority of circuits have held that open spaces on a college 
campus are designated public forums. Id. at 513–14 (Moore, J., concurring). As 
such, speech regulations governing designated public forums would be subject 
to strict scrutiny review. Id. at 514 (Moore, J., concurring). In yet another 
case, American Civil Liberties Union v. Mote, a public university permitted 
members of the university community to engage in public speaking and dis-
tribute handbills in outdoor areas of campus. 423 F.3d 438, 442 (4th Cir. 
2005). Members of the general public were permitted access to these same 
outdoor areas for virtually all purposes except for public speaking and the dis-
tribution of leaflets. Id. Only university community members were permitted 
to engage in these expressive activities in most open outdoor campus locations. 
Id. The court determined that these campus areas were a non-public forum by 
default. Id. at 444. However, because they had been opened for particular ex-
pressive uses, they now constituted a limited public forum. Id. As such, speech 
restrictions governing their use would be upheld if they were viewpoint-
neutral and reasonable in light of their purpose. Id. at 445. 
Examining the issues from yet another perspective, in Bloedorn v. Grube, 
the court concluded that neither an on-campus interior sidewalk, a pedestrian 
mall, nor a rotunda could be characterized as a traditional public forum. 631 
F.3d 1218, 1232–34 (11th Cir. 2011). While the physical characteristics of the-
se locations on campus certainly resembled streets and parks, the physical 
characteristics of the property standing alone “cannot dictate forum analysis.” 
Id. at 1233. Most importantly, the traditional purpose and use of university 
property is distinct from the purpose and customary uses of municipal streets 
and parks. Id. at 1233–34. After considering the university’s regulations limit-
ing access to the campus for expressive purposes, the court concluded that the 
locations at issue were properly determined to be a limited public forum. Id. at 
1235. See generally Nathan W. Kellum, If It Looks Like a Duck . . . Traditional 
Public Forum Status of Open Areas on Public University Campuses, 33 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2005) (discussing how many universities’ positions 
toward free speech on campus run afoul of Supreme Court decisions). 
 97. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding 
that second floor hallway and offices of the social sciences building was a non-
public forum). 
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circumstances the university will be held to have created a des-
ignated or limited public forum.98 When it does so, students re-
ceive increased protection in those locations against content-
discriminatory speech regulations. However, determining what 
constitutes a designated or limited public forum can be a con-
fusing problem for lower courts to resolve as a matter of law99 
and in many cases, it will require a fact-specific analysis based 
on the adjudication of disputed facts.100 
All of this indeterminacy is no friend to freedom of speech. 
Uncertainty chills speech. As a Fifth Circuit panel explained in 
a case involving the status of university property at the Uni-
versity of Texas, Austin,  
If individuals are left to guess whether they have crossed some invisi-
ble line between a public and non-public forum, and if that line di-
vides two worlds—one in which they are free to engage in free speech, 
and another in which they can be held criminally liable for that 
speech—then there can be no doubt that some will be less likely to 
pursue their constitutional rights, even in the world where their 
speech would be protected.101 
It would seem, however, that some significant degree of 
uncertainty is unavoidable in a context where different uses of 
property with correspondingly different statuses as a tradition-
al public forum, designated public forum, limited public forum, 
and non-public forum exist in a patchwork quilt of free speech 
regimes. Courts have recognized that “fora have geographical 
boundaries [and] different kinds of fora may abut.”102 In such 
circumstances by taking a single step, students may find their 
 
 98. See, e.g., Bowman, 444 F.3d at 978–79 (holding that specific open are-
as in a public university are unlimited designated public forums accessible 
both to student and non-student speakers); Hays Cty. Guardian, 969 F.2d at 
118 (holding that the university’s outdoor premises where student expression 
was routinely permitted constituted a designated public forum). 
 99. See, e.g., Bowman, 444 F.3d at 975 (describing lower court forum deci-
sions as far from lucid and involving substantial confusion). The confusion ex-
ists at all levels of decision-making. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, for 
example, the Supreme Court applied the same deferential standard of review 
previously thought to be reserved for non-public forums to speech and associa-
tion regulations governing what the Court described as a limited public forum. 
See Brownstein & Amar, supra note 6, at 507–08. 
 100. See, e.g., Bowman, 444 F.3d at 979 (explicitly limiting its designated 
public forum holding to only the three areas on campus at issue in the case 
before it); Brister, 214 F.3d at 683 n.5 (noting that the public forum holding 
applies only to the specific property at issue in the case and does not apply to 
any other property in the vicinity). 
 101. Brister, 214 F.3d at 682–83. 
 102. Students for Life USA v. Waldrop, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1232 (S.D. 
Ala. 2016). 
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free speech rights transformed from the full panoply of consti-
tutional protection to far more limited protection that accepts 
substantial restrictions on speech.103 
If university property is generally characterized as a non-
public forum, student free speech rights might be sharply re-
stricted. Content-discriminatory speech regulations would be 
upheld as long as they are reasonable—a very deferential 
standard of review. Pursuant to accepted Supreme Court au-
thority, the government may restrict controversial speech and 
political advocacy in a non-public forum in order to maintain an 
appearance of neutrality.104 Following this line of reasoning, at 
least one district court has upheld a university’s restrictions on 
student speech near the perimeter of the campus for the pur-
pose of avoiding any suggestion that the university was taking 
a position on divisive political issues.105 Even in a non-public fo-
rum, students would still have free speech rights against view-
point-discriminatory restrictions on their expression.106 That is 
not insignificant protection. Still, because students would have 
greater protection against content-discriminatory laws in those 
locations where the university has created a designated or 
broadly defined limited public forum, determining whether a 
campus location is a public or non-public forum has considera-
ble importance. 
The line drawing here may be particularly acute when uni-
versity administrators struggle to respond to campus protests. 
One problem involves challenges to the university’s commit-
ment to viewpoint neutrality. It is black letter free speech doc-
trine that the university cannot treat certain protests more or 
less favorably than others because of the message the protes-
tors are expressing. Content-neutral time, place, and manner 
rules may be enforced and will be upheld if they are reasonable 
in a non-public forum or satisfy intermediate level scrutiny in a 
traditional or limited public forum. But the key requirement is 
that these regulations must be enforced neutrally and equally. 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808–10 
(1985). 
 105. Waldrop, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1234–36. 
 106. See, e.g., Gerlich v. Leath, No 4:14-CV-00264-JEG, 2015 WL 4097755, 
at *7 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 6, 2015) (ruling that viewpoint-discriminatory decision 
restricting student organization’s message on t-shirts would violate the First 
Amendment). 
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This is easier said than done. Often the police and admin-
istrative authorities responding to a campus protest are con-
fronted with hard choices. The rigid enforcement of campus 
time, place, and manner rules against protestors may exacer-
bate an incident and result in greater disorder and danger to 
third parties. It may often seem advisable to waive the en-
forcement of the campus rules at least temporarily. The prob-
lem arises when other protestors insist that they be granted 
the same accommodation and relaxation of campus speech reg-
ulations that prior protestors expressing a different message 
received. It may be that the facts on the ground do not warrant 
waiving speech regulations for the second protest. But that dif-
ference in treatment may be difficult to defend after the fact 
when the most obvious difference between two protests is that 
one group of protestors was allowed to violate the allegedly 
neutral speech regulations while other protestors expressing a 
different message were required to comply with the same regu-
lations. 
A somewhat similar predicament arises with regard to the 
creation of a designated or limited public forum. Many of these 
cases are relatively easy to resolve. If a university generally al-
lows most student groups to use classrooms after-hours for 
meetings and other expressive activities, it will be difficult for 
the administration to insist that it has not created a designated 
or limited public forum. But what if the administration is con-
fronted with protests in administration buildings or other loca-
tions where student expressive activity is considered far less 
appropriate and is prohibited by campus rules? If the admin-
istration repeatedly allows different protest groups to comman-
deer these facilities for ongoing protest activity, does there 
reach a point where, by its conduct and practice, the university 
may be held to have created a limited public forum for campus 
protests in those specific locations?107 Here again, the demands 
of free speech doctrine for uniformity of treatment may clash 
with the practical exigencies that university administrators 
confront in dealing with specific incidents on campus. 
This difficulty is aggravated by free speech rules that pro-
hibit government institutions from leaving decisions about who 
may speak and how, and when and where particular expression 
may occur, to the unbridled discretion of public officials. This 
 
 107. See, e.g., Waldrop, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1279–85 (closely examining al-
leged exceptions to the university’s speech policy to determine whether in 
practice it has created a far more open forum than its stated policy suggests). 
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long-standing requirement for traditional public forums has 
been extended to non-public forums.108 There is certainly an ar-
gument to be made that, for free speech purposes, there is little 
distinction between university speech regulations that can be 
waived at an administrator’s discretion during student protests 
and the kind of unbridled discretion regime that the First 
Amendment prohibits. 
II.  THE EXTENT TO WHICH UNIVERSITY FACULTY 
ENJOY ANY SPECIAL FIRST AMENDMENT ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM   
We next turn to the academic freedom enjoyed by faculty at 
public universities. As noted above, faculty may enjoy freedom 
to control curricula, classrooms, student research, and the like 
when they are authorized by university higher-ups to do so, but 
what First Amendment rights do they have when they clash 
with university administrators and political oversight bodies? 
Many public universities are grappling with these issues fre-
quently and prominently these days. The two universities with 
which we are associated are good examples: at the University of 
Illinois (where one of us is now dean of the law school) a very 
public controversy arose in the last few years surrounding the 
(non)hiring of Steven Salaita based on the content of his 
tweets;109 and at the University of California (where both of us 
served as law professors for over two decades) the Office of the 
President issued definitional guidance and, some would say, 
threats to faculty and staff concerning so-called microagg-
ressions.110 These great public universities are two of many that 
 
 108. See, e.g., Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 343–44 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (finding that the unbridled discretion doctrine applies to non-public 
forums). 
 109. Good background on the Steven Salaita controversy (involving the 
university’s 2014 decision not to follow through with a tenured appointment 
for Professor Salaita based on controversial tweets and other social media ut-
terances he made) can be found in the Report on the Investigation into the 
Matter of Steven Salaita. COMM. ON ACAD. FREEDOM & TENURE (CAFT), UNIV. 
OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
MATTER OF STEVEN SALAITA, http://www.ais.illinois.edu/documents/ 
CAFTReport.pdf [hereinafter CAFT REPORT]. 
 110. “Microaggressions,” which can lead to a legally actionable hostile 
learning environment, are defined for these purposes as “the everyday verbal, 
nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or insults, whether intentional 
or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative messages 
to target persons based solely upon their marginalized group membership.” 
TOOL: RECOGNIZING MICROAGGRESSIONS AND THE MESSAGES THEY SEND, 
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currently find themselves at the epicenter of conflict over free-
dom of expression at, and the orderly functioning of, public in-
stitutions of higher education. 
In the space below, we briefly examine the breadth of so-
called “academic freedom” enjoyed under the First Amendment 
by (even fully tenured) faculty at public universities by compar-
ing the scope of liberties of public professors with three rele-
vant counterparts: public university students (discussed above), 
non-professorial public employees, and private university pro-
fessors. And again, we focus primarily on the liberties enjoyed 
by virtue of the First Amendment—freedoms that arise from 
other aspects of the Constitution such as due process, and non-
constitutional sources altogether (such as academic freedom 
traditions, state statutes or constitutions, or contract law) are 
important to be sure, but they will receive lesser attention in 
our Article. 
Notwithstanding talk in some Supreme Court cases about 
the importance of “academic freedom” and the special role uni-
versity faculties play in American democracy and society, it is 
not clear that even tenured public university professors enjoy 
any special expressive latitude, at least under the First 
Amendment. Indeed, the First Amendment in many respects 
protects public university students significantly more than fac-
ulty, because students are regulated individuals (as students 
and/or residents of a campus community), whereas faculty are 
government employees. Settled First Amendment doctrine 
gives the government far more latitude to regulate the speech 
of its workers than the speech of its citizenry, both because the 
smooth functioning of government is an interest that is 
weighed against free speech, and because (in some settings) 
government itself speaks through its employees. These basic 
notions are captured, in an overstated and somewhat flippant 
way, by the quip of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who (while serv-
ing as a state appellate judge at the time) remarked in a case: 
“The petitioner [a police officer] may have a constitutional right 
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a po-
liceman.”111 A more accurate, nuanced, and helpful explication 
 
http://academicaffairs.ucsc.edu/events/documents/Microaggressions_ 
Examples_Arial_2014_11_12.pdf [hereinafter MICROAGGRESSION AVOIDANCE 
GUIDE]. 
 111. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). We 
note that the modern Court has not embraced Justice Holmes’s reasoning to 
its full logical conclusion. 
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of these ideas has been provided by the Court in a series of cas-
es involving the First Amendment and public employment 
handed down over the last half century.112 
In Pickering v. Board of Education, a case involving a pub-
lic teacher who was dismissed for writing and publishing a 
letter in a newspaper criticizing, among other things, the Board 
of Education’s fiscal policies and the job performance of the 
Board’s superintendent, the Court made clear that “the State 
has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in 
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in 
general.”113 Because of these interests, the government may 
impose sanctions on expressive activities of government 
employees even when such restraints “would be plainly 
unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.”114 
Under the so-called “Pickering balancing test,” the 
government’s interests in “promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees” must be 
weighed against the employee’s interest in free speech.115 At the 
first stage, the employee must show that his or her speech 
pertains to a matter of public concern (as opposed to a 
workplace grievance) as to which there is a meaningful First 
Amendment interest.116 At the second stage, the government 
can prevail by showing that the employee’s speech—even if 
relevant to public debate—does in fact interfere in a significant 
way with the operations of the governmental unit in question.117 
Importantly, the Pickering framework does not allow the 
government to use its authority as employer to “silence 
discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply 
because superiors [in the government department or office] 
disagree with the content of employees’ speech.”118 
A decade ago, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,119 the Court 
substantially refined the analysis to be undertaken in cases 
 
 112. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); United States v. 
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 
U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 113. 391 U.S. at 568. 
 114. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 465. 
 115. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 116. Id. at 571–72. 
 117. Id. at 572–73. 
 118. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). 
 119. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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when public employers discipline employees for expressive 
activities. The employee in Ceballos was a line district attorney 
who wrote a memo challenging a police affidavit used to 
support a warrant application, and who then claimed he was 
improperly retaliated against for the written content and 
advocacy contained in the memo.120 The Supreme Court ruled 
that as long as “public employees [are] mak[ing] statements 
pursuant to their official duties [as was true with the Ceballos 
plaintiff], the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline,”121 even if the 
matters on which they are speaking are of public concern. The 
Ceballos Court, seemingly prompted by a comment in the 
dissent about academic freedom,122 declined to decide whether 
its new framework would apply to “speech related to 
scholarship or teaching.”123 
The key distinction in Ceballos is between speech qua em-
ployee and speech qua citizen. What a public employee says as 
part of his job—to fulfill his assigned duties—is not protected 
by the First Amendment, even if it involves a matter of public 
concern. Only what public employees say as citizens in their 
private capacities receives constitutional protection. If Ceballos 
were to apply to all academic settings, its speech-limiting ef-
 
 120. Id. at 413–15. 
 121. Id. at 421. 
 122. Id. at 438–39 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This ostensible domain beyond 
the pale of the First Amendment is spacious enough to include even the 
teaching of a public university professor, and I have to hope that today’s 
majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic 
freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak 
and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (“We have long recognized that, given the important 
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought 
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special 
niche in our constitutional tradition.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over 
the classroom. ‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere 
more vital than in the community of American schools.’” (quoting Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960))); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
250 (1957) (determining that a governmental inquiry into the contents of a 
scholar’s lectures at a state university “unquestionably was an invasion of 
[his] liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression—areas 
in which government should be extremely reticent to tread”). 
 123. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 425. 
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fects would be obvious. No public educators would be protected 
by First Amendment academic freedom with regard to on-the-
job speech. 
These limitations on free speech protection would not only 
undermine academic freedom; they would raise difficult prob-
lems of application as well. Deciding what is on-the-job speech 
is not always easy. The scope of what constitutes employee, as 
opposed to citizen, speech can be unclear. With regard to K–12 
instructors, perhaps all of a teacher’s statements during class 
can be viewed as part of the job, but what of conversations with 
students out of class, during lunch period, or before the school 
day formally begins? More problematically, how do we deter-
mine the job parameters of university professors who are often 
expected—as part of the scholarship and service components of 
their job—to speak to government, the press, professional asso-
ciations, and other audiences, and to publish articles and books 
for diverse dissemination? If courts find such expression to be 
part of the job, and unprotected, then university professors may 
be punished for speaking in situations where they would have 
the most impact—when their comments are based on their pro-
fessional expertise. Far from having greater protection for their 
speech than the average citizen under the rubric of academic 
freedom, as many people might assume, education workers 
would actually have much, much less. Most citizens do not risk 
their livelihood when they publish articles or books or speak 
out on public issues. 
Perhaps in significant part because of these problems, the 
federal courts of appeals have not uniformly or wholeheartedly 
rushed to apply Ceballos to the higher education sphere, even 
though it does seem regularly to be implemented in the K–12 
realm. Regarding post-secondary instructors, the Seventh Cir-
cuit at least recognizes Ceballos’s arguable relevance, and has 
at a high level of generality applied Ceballos’s teachings con-
cerning “the appropriate weight to [be given] to the public em-
ployer’s interests,” even in cases where it believes the ruling in 
Ceballos “is not directly” on point.124 By contrast, the Ninth and 
Fourth Circuits have explicitly determined that Ceballos does 
not govern First Amendment claims by university academics.125 
 
 124. Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 125. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Lee 
v. York Cty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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But even if Ceballos doesn’t absolutely eliminate public 
professors’ First Amendment claims, the Pickering standard 
(which courts that have not applied Ceballos to higher educa-
tion continue to use) is already generous to public university 
employers. Indeed, concerns over academic freedom may influ-
ence the decision by some courts to apply Pickering rather than 
(the more absolutist) Ceballos, but academic freedom doesn’t do 
much work in the cases thereafter and arguably is largely irrel-
evant to this analysis. Teachers and professors are public em-
ployees, no different than police officers or nurses. Under this 
approach, public employee expression is protected when it ad-
dresses matters of public concern, but that protection is bal-
anced against, and may be outweighed by, competing state in-
terests. Ad hoc balancing tests are necessarily indeterminate 
and uncertain in their application, and uncertainty chills 
speech. 
Moreover, taken literally, Pickering’s focus on whether 
speech involves a matter of public concern seems to protect 
some teachers more than others. Math professors may seldom 
write on matters of public concern. Their academic freedom, 
under this test, would be near non-existent. Social studies 
teachers or law professors regularly speak and write on mat-
ters of public concern and would have much of their expression 
protected to some extent, subject to the court’s balancing analy-
sis. If differential equations ever become a public issue, profes-
sors who comment on it will receive free speech protection, too. 
Perhaps the most pro-academic-freedom First Amendment 
lower court case we have come across is Rodriguez v. Maricopa 
County Community College District, in which the Ninth Circuit 
spoke broadly—in the context of a community college profes-
sor’s seemingly racist emails which were distributed through 
the college email system to all district employees—about the 
need for public college teachers to have leeway under the First 
Amendment because “[i]ntellectual advancement has tradition-
ally progressed through discord and dissent.”126 And the role of 
colleges and universities in fostering that exchange “will not 
survive if certain points of view [are] declared beyond the 
pale.”127 For this reason, “[t]he desire to maintain a sedate aca-
demic environment . . . [does not] justify limitations on a teach-
er’s freedom to express himself on political issues in vigorous, 
 
 126. 605 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 127. Id. 
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argumentative, unmeasured, and even distinctly unpleasant 
terms.”128 
But as ambitious as the Rodriguez case was in its discus-
sion of the First Amendment values of academic freedom, the 
case was about a narrower issue—namely, whether the math 
professor’s racist emails constituted harassment and thus cre-
ated a hostile work environment under Title VII such that col-
lege administrators were remiss in not taking disciplinary ac-
tions against the professor.129 The court ruled that because the 
emails weren’t targeted to anyone in particular, they did not 
constitute harassment, and thus the administrators could not 
be sued for failing to take action.130 There is language in the 
case suggesting that the professor’s emails are protected from 
sanction by the First Amendment,131 but such language is utter 
dicta, since no disciplinary action was initiated. Moreover, the 
broad dicta is itself not very thoroughly explicated, insofar as 
the opinion nowhere discusses the fact that the professor was a 
public employee; the opinion cites and quotes numerous cases 
involving government regulation of private individuals132 but 
never confronts, let alone overcomes, the power Pickering con-
fers on government employers to avoid disruption. 
All of the foregoing makes clear that, compared to stu-
dents, public university faculty may enjoy considerably less ex-
pressive leeway in many circumstances. Consider, as an illus-
tration, the University of California’s document providing 
examples of impermissible microaggressions that we adverted 
to earlier. No public university could even vaguely threaten a 
student (as opposed to a faculty member) with punishment for 
creating a hostile learning environment by using the phrase 
“America is a melting pot”—no matter the context in which 
that phrase was invoked.133 Nor could any public university im-
pose negative consequences on a student for posting on social 
media the intemperate (and in the minds of many people anti-
 
 128. Id. at 708–09 (quoting Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929, 934 (9th 
Cir. 1975)). 
 129. Id. at 706–07. 
 130. Id. at 708–10. 
 131. Id. at 710–11. 
 132. See id. at 709 (invoking Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which 
held unconstitutional a state law forbidding the teaching of any subject in a 
foreign language to students who had not yet passed the eighth grade). 
 133. See MICROAGGRESSION AVOIDANCE GUIDE, supra note 110. 
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Semitic) comments that Steven Salaita—whose tenured posi-
tion at the University of Illinois never materialized—tweeted. 
Indeed, close inspection reveals that professors may fare 
more poorly even than many other public university employees. 
As the post-Pickering cases from the Supreme Court and lower 
courts make clear, the kinds of government function disruption 
that can justify discipline—disturbing harmony among co-
workers, detrimental impact on close working relationships, in-
terference with the speaker’s performance of duties—are the 
very kinds of problems that arise often in the higher education 
setting, where faculty must work closely with—and be trusted 
by—students and fellow academics. Moreover, “[t]he burden of 
caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak 
will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability 
the employee’s role entails.”134 One lower court has elaborated 
on that point to say that “[t]he level of protection afforded to an 
employee’s activities will vary with the amount of authority 
and public accountability the employee’s position entails. A po-
sition requiring confidentiality, policymaking, or public contact 
lessens the public employer’s burden in firing an employee for 
expression that offends the employer.”135 And with regard to 
educators, a public school teacher “is a position [that] by its 
very nature requires a degree of public trust not found in many 
other positions of public employment.”136  
Add to this the fact that government discrimination con-
cerning the content of public professor speech is inevitable and 
necessary in a way that is not true for other public employees. 
Public university employers invariably must make decisions 
about the hiring, promotion, and retention of professors based 
on the content (even the viewpoint) of what these professors 
say and write. The questions asked at hiring and promotion 
stages—are the professor’s expressed views scientifically plau-
sible, adequately supported, rigorously reasoned, appropriately 
attentive to counterargument, etc.—are, at their core, content-
based inquiries. Even the Ninth Circuit ruling declining to ap-
ply Ceballos to higher education makes this clear: 
[T]he evaluation of a professor’s writing for purposes of tenure or 
promotion involves a judgment by the employing university about the 
quality of what he or she has written. Ordinarily, such a content-
 
 134. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987). 
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based judgment is anathema to the First Amendment. But in the aca-
demic world, such a judgment is both necessary and appropriate. 
Here too, recognizing our limitations, we should hesitate before con-
cluding that we know better than the institution itself the nature and 
strength of its legitimate interests.137 
If a building maintenance worker on campus prominently 
proclaims his birther views, he may be immune from sanction. 
But if an American history professor does, that shoddy evalua-
tion of historical facts can be used against him in professional 
assessments. Another example: many people think that the 
constitutional Obamacare challenge was very weak analytical-
ly, even though it got four votes at the Supreme Court.138 If, five 
years ago, a law dean decided not to go forward with someone’s 
tenure file because she thought the candidate’s article laying 
out what the author believed to be a forceful constitutional 
challenge to Obamacare was poor scholarship, would the dean 
be guilty of violating academic freedom? 
To be sure, none of this means that public universities can 
use their content-based authority over faculty as a means of 
censoring political expression that is clearly citizen advocacy 
and unrelated to one’s job as a professor. An administrator pun-
ishing a faculty member for urging, on her own time, the repeal 
of Obamacare is different than the administrator determining 
that the faculty member’s article arguing Obamacare is beyond 
Congress’s constitutional powers is poor scholarship that cuts 
against promotion. 
Finally, perhaps most problematically, even under Picker-
ing—the more pro-speech of the potentially applicable tests—
off-campus speech can sometimes affect credibility in school, 
and First Amendment cases recognize that government may 
sometimes take account of “off-the-job” expression in deciding 
whether a person is fit to perform a public job. As one lower 
court observed in allowing a school district to discipline a phys-
ics teacher for being an active and outspoken member of a 
group (the North American Man/Boy Love Association) advo-
cating sexual relationships between men and boys, the Picker-
ing balancing test is “not limited to conduct occurring at or di-
 
 137. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 413 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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rectly relating to the workplace.”139 Drawing on clear Supreme 
Court directives, the court reminded that “[a]ttenuation of 
time, place or content of speech from the workplace is ultimate-
ly accounted for in the balancing part of the process, but those 
factors will not absolutely preclude government regulation.”140 
This contextual approach makes good practical sense and 
has implications for professors, given the nature of their jobs: if 
a university groundskeeper is the leader of a local KKK chap-
ter, he is not (by virtue of his nonviolent KKK activities) inca-
pable of being an effective groundskeeper. But if a public school 
law professor is a KKK leader, can he really be effective and 
credible in teaching minority (or white) students? Even protec-
tors of academic freedom values that chafe against “civility” be-
ing used to rescind a faculty job offer distinguish between “civil-
ity” and “professional fitness,” which would encompass both 
scholarly values and teaching effectiveness. The report by the 
University of Illinois Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure on the Salaita matter (which contained significant criti-
cism of the University of Illinois administration), for example, 
tried to distinguish between “civility,” which was too vague a 
basis on which to rescind a faculty job offer, and “professional 
fitness,” a criteria for employment on which off-the-job and pri-
vate expressive activities could reasonably bear.141 Given this 
reality and that the inherent nature of a professor’s job re-
quires him to deal with a wide range of students in settings of 
mutual trust, public professors must be more careful than 
many (most) other public employees in what they say and do 
even when they are away from the worksite. 
Consider in this regard the very recent flap over the 
Oregon law faculty member’s wearing of a costume that 
included blackface at a private, off-campus Halloween party—
but one to which she invited students and faculty members. 
According to press accounts, the tenured Oregon law professor, 
Nancy Shurtz, was placed on paid administrative leave after 
her use of blackface became known.142 University of Oregon 
 
 139. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 194. 
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President Michael Schill, himself a former law dean, issued a 
university statement saying: “We condemn [her] action 
unequivocally as anathema to the University of Oregon’s 
cherished values of racial diversity and inclusion. The use of 
blackface, even in jest at a Halloween party, is patently 
offensive and reinforces historically racist stereotypes. It was a 
stupid act and is in no way defensible.”143 
Professor Shurtz explained that her costume was inspired 
by Damon Tweedy, an African American doctor who penned the 
bestselling memoir Black Man in a White Coat: A Doctor’s 
Reflections on Race and Medicine: “I chose my costume based 
on a book that I read and liked. . . . I thought I would be able to 
teach with this costume. . . . I am sorry if it did not come off 
well. I . . . would not want to offend.”144 Meanwhile, a letter 
signed by twenty-three of her Oregon law faculty colleagues 
calls for her resignation, saying “[i]f . . . you did in fact wear 
blackface to a Halloween party, you need to resign. It doesn’t 
matter what your intentions were. . . . Your actions implicate 
all of us and our community.”145 
We think Professor Shurtz’s colleagues are wrong, even as 
to First Amendment freedoms, about whether intent matters. 
After all, the reason (correctly identified by those calling for her 
resignation) that Shurtz’s actions warrant serious scrutiny is 
that they may undermine her (and the university’s) trust and 
credibility with students, alumni, and the community. But 
wouldn’t students, alumni, and the outside world want to know 
why she did what she did in deciding how much less they like 
and trust her and the law school? If she did it to mock African 
Americans (or merely “in jest” because she is flippant about 
race), aren’t they likely to be much more angry and disaffected 
than if she did it to support the cause of racial equality (like the 
author of Black Like Me who feigned blackness to document 
racism), even if her attempt was clumsy, ill advised, and ulti-
mately counterproductive? 
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But our bigger point here is that even if intent matters, 
and even if the sanction of removal would seem hard to justify 
under First Amendment principles, the university might be 
able to impose some significantly lesser sanction on Professor 
Shurtz’s seemingly negligent decision to speak in a way that 
was likely to cause disruption to the university’s operations and 
community relations.146 The fact that the university temporarily 
suspended her shows it thought it had the power to do so; could 
anyone imagine the university suspending its mailroom clerk 
for the same unfortunate mistake?147 
Finally, a few words are in order about whether the mod-
ern framework described above is in any meaningful way a re-
treat from the “foundational” academic freedom cases from the 
1950s and 1960s in which states were prevented from imposing 
loyalty oaths and the like on public professors as a condition of 
employment. To begin with, some of the most oft-cited language 
about the First Amendment’s protection of university academic 
freedom in these cases is drawn from dissents, not majority 
opinions. For example, Justice Douglas’s dissenting language in 
Adler v. Board of Education to the effect that academic freedom 
is central to “the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment 
was designed to protect”148 is frequently quoted by academic 
freedom proponents, but less quoted is Justice Minton’s majori-
ty opinion, which observes—in a way that doesn’t fully capture 
the nuance of the Pickering doctrine that would ensue—that 
while  
 
 146. The University of Oregon has in an administrative proceeding reas-
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imposed has not yet been finally determined. For an argument supporting 
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[i]t is clear that [public employees] have the right under our law to 
assemble, speak, think and believe as they will . . . [i]t is equally clear 
that they have no right to work for the State in the school system on 
their own terms. . . . If they do not choose to work on [the terms of-
fered by the state], they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and asso-
ciations and go elsewhere.149 
Once again, this simplistic and absolutist language from 
Justice Minton doesn’t reflect current law, but we must re-
member that even as the cases reviewing attempts to rid civil 
service of “subversives” were being decided, the government 
employer element of the disputes was in the mix. More im-
portantly, in these pre-Pickering cases, which the government 
lost or should have lost, the government was not making the 
specific showings of disruption to government operations need-
ed to uphold public employee discipline; instead, it was arguing 
that all civil service should be free of anyone who holds danger-
ous beliefs—not that a particular person’s belief, because of his 
or her particular job, was in fact or in all predictive likelihood 
going to interfere with government operations. Even today’s 
framework that allows for significant government employer 
leeway in the regulation of public employee expression does 
not, as observed earlier, permit the government to use its 
employer status to “silence discourse, not because it hampers 
public functions but simply because superiors [in the 
government department or office] disagree with the content of 
employees’ speech”150—precisely what government was trying to 
do during the early Cold War. 
As we have seen, from a First Amendment perspective, the 
academic freedom of public university faculty is limited and 
uncertain. However, free speech doctrine provides some protec-
tion to faculty expression, particularly with regard to off-
campus political speech that is unrelated to a faculty member’s 
duties as a professional academic. While some faculty speech 
may straddle the line between the academic expression of an 
employee that may be subject to university evaluation and con-
trol and related citizen commentary on public policy matters, 
other speech activities—such as partisan political campaigning 
or spiritual expression as part of a religious congregation—
cannot reasonably be subsumed under the rubric of academic 
duties, however broadly they may be defined. Further, there 
are clear constitutional grounds for restricting any state actor, 
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including a university administration, from sanctioning such 
political or religious expression. 
When we compare public university professors’ rights to 
those enjoyed by private university professor counterparts, we 
see, on the one hand, that no such constitutional guarantees 
protect faculty at private universities from restrictions on their 
speech imposed by their employers. The private university, af-
ter all, is not a state actor. Indeed, the constitutional shoe is 
very much on the other foot in this circumstance. To the extent 
the First Amendment applies at all to an academic freedom 
dispute between a private university and its faculty, it would 
protect the right of the private university to choose and enforce 
its own values. Freedom of speech, association, and religion all 
coalesce to protect the autonomy of a private university, which 
limits the speech of its faculty on or off campus. Legislation at-
tempting to protect the academic freedom of private university 
faculty would have to take account of these constitutional 
guarantees. 
Courts may consider the institutional autonomy and aca-
demic freedom of a public university as a state interest to be 
balanced against the free speech rights of faculty. The state’s 
interest in affirming the autonomy of its public universities in 
disputes with faculty, however, is different than recognizing a 
constitutional right to public university institutional autonomy 
that protects the exercise of authority to restrict faculty speech. 
On the constitutional ledger, private universities are protected 
by the First Amendment against state interference in their 
governance to some extent and they are not limited by it at all 
when they restrict faculty speech. 
Of course, on the other hand, a different analysis applies if 
faculty of either a public or a private university are sanctioned 
by non-university state actors for off-campus speech. Here, fac-
ulty would have the full panoply of free speech rights available 
to any citizen. Faculty, like other public employees, only have 
limited free speech rights when the government acts as their 
employer—not when it acts in its general regulatory capacity. 
If a faculty member is going to be arrested for inciting unlawful 
conduct, for example, he or she would be protected under 
Brandenburg v. Ohio against criminal sanction, unless he or 
she intended “imminent lawless action” that was in fact likely 
to ensue.151 
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From a contemporary perspective, there is a strong cultur-
al commitment to academic freedom at many private universi-
ties. That commitment extends to public universities as well. 
Both institutions are subject to challenges from outside forces 
who may exercise financial leverage over colleges: the taxpay-
ers through the legislature for public universities and alumni 
and other donors for private colleges. Constitutional law con-
tributes to the resolution of those conflicts to only a limited ex-
tent—in favor of the faculty at public universities and in favor 
of the institutional administration at private colleges. 
III.  POSTSCRIPT: BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT   
Given the analyses and comparisons we have offered, in 
which public professors often fare worse than their counter-
parts, the very term “academic freedom” as applied to the pub-
lic professoriate may seem inapt—usually we think of “free-
doms” as especially generous liberties or licenses, not watered-
down rights. And yet there are several important ways in 
which public professors do enjoy special “academic freedoms” 
that we should note before concluding. 
First, as we have written elsewhere, the First Amendment 
is not the only constitutional provision arguably relevant to ac-
ademic freedom; principles of due process and notice also play 
an important role.152 Most people talk about academic freedom 
in terms of a freedom to express ideas, but perhaps an im-
portant additional approach is to think about it as a freedom to 
know what you can and cannot express. Vagueness and notice 
protections have special applicability to the public education 
setting, both at universities and at secondary schools. For ex-
ample, think of K–12 teachers who get in trouble for teaching 
controversial topics in ways later deemed improper by local au-
thorities. Courts do and should make sure that public profes-
sors are not misled into expressing themselves in ways that 
later could result in their sanction or dismissal. We need—and 
the Constitution may require—clear ex ante standards that 
eliminate chilling effects for public academics if the public 
academy has any meaningful role to play in democracy. So, as 
Eugene Volokh has pointed out, one of the most troubling as-
pects of the University of California’s microaggression guidance 
document (even if the UC can constitutionally define and pun-
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ish microaggressions quite broadly) is the chilling effect the in-
scrutability of the document creates.153 Even if government has 
the authority to control the expression of its public professors, 
it should be required to do so clearly, both to avoid due process 
problems and to expose its censorial decisions to political heat 
they deserve. In a related vein, in the Salaita affair—putting 
the First Amendment aside—one of Mr. Salaita’s strongest 
claims may arise from implicit promises made in the universi-
ty’s offer letter about the extent to which his freedom of expres-
sion would be allowed.154 
And, as we hope we have made clear throughout this Arti-
cle, another important kind of academic freedom is grounded 
not in free speech or clear notice principles, but non-
constitutional sources altogether. As we noted in Part II, state 
constitutions, contract law, industry practice, and the like may 
give rise to legally or culturally binding rules that protect pub-
lic professors, even as the contours of such rules will vary by 
state and by university—and perhaps also by campus or even 
department. Academic freedom is an important idea, even 
apart from any First Amendment or other constitutional foot-
ing it enjoys.155 
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